The Implications of Alternative Saving and Expectations Hypotheses for Choices of Technique and Patterns of Growth by Stiglitz, Joseph E. & Cass, David
The Implications of Alternative Saving 
and Expectations Hypotheses for Choices 
of Technique and Patterns of Growth 
David Cass and Joseph E. Stiglitz 
Yale University 
I. Introduction 
It has become increasingly clear that there are serious problems with the 
concept of aggregate capital. It is now known, for instance, that, if there 
are many vintages of machines, the output of the economy can be described 
by a simple neoclassical production function with an aggregate capital 
stock if and only if technical change is purely capital augmenting (Fisher, 
1965); that in steady states consumption per capita may not be a mono- 
tonic function of the rate of interest, even for rates of interest greater than 
the rate of growth; and that the value of the capital stock per man (using 
any price system) may not be monotonic in r (Wicksell effects) (Champer- 
nowne, 1953-54). The heterogeneity of capital goods, moreover, raises new 
problems for the dynamic behavior of the economy. Investment must be 
allocated, and to do this firms must form expectations of future prices, 
wages, and interest rates. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate in detail the dynamics of a 
simple model with heterogeneous capital goods under alternative assump- 
tions about expectations formation and saving. Before investment takes 
place, the entrepreneur has a choice over a large number (to be precise, 
a continuum) of types of machines; those which require more resources 
today require less labor per unit of output in the future. But once the 
machine has been constructed, it cannot be altered. This is just the ex- 
ante smooth substitutability-ex post rigid complementarity model (or the 
putty-clay model), alternative versions of which have been studied by 
Johansen (1959) and Solow (1962). (See also Phelps, 1963; Akerlof, 1967; 
Sheshinski, 1967; and Stiglitz, 1968.) This model raises, moreover, the 
interesting problem of economic obsolescence: machines may be con- 
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structed which subsequently, because of higher wage rates, are no longer 
profitable to operate. 
We shall be interested in determining how the dynamic behavior of this 
economy differs from that of the economy with malleable capital, as 
analyzed by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) for the descriptive growth 
model and by Ramsey (1928) for the optimal growth model. It will be shown 
that, although there are fundamental differences in short-run behavior, 
in the long run the economy evolves much like the economy described by 
the simpler malleable capital models. On the other hand, econometric 
estimation based on the use of the malleable capital model, such as that of 
Solow (1957) in estimating the residual, or Arrow, Chenery, Minhas, and 
Solow (1961) in estimating the elasticity of substitution, may encounter 
serious biases from the specification error. 
In Part II we set forth the basic model; Part III analyzes the behavior of 
the economy under static expectations and alternative saving assumptions. 
Part IV presents the perfect foresight model with a constant saving rate; 
in Part V the saving rate is chosen to maximize the discounted sum of con- 
sumption. Part VI sketches a model in which firms act on probability 
distributions of possible wages rather than on point estimates. In Part VII 
the implications of the model for econometric estimation are outlined. 
II. The Model 
The technology underlying our model is perhaps the simplest which still 
captures the essential features of heterogeneous capital goods. There is a 
single final good, Y(t), each unit of which can be allocated to provide 
either a unit of consumption or a unit of capital of type k. Each unit of 
capital of type k has the following properties: (1) to be fully utilized it 
requires labor input at the rate 1/k, and (2) when fully utilized it produces 
final output at the rate f(k)/k. In other words k is simply the capital-labor 
ratio (where capital is measured in terms of original or replacement cost), 
andf(k) the output-labor ratio associated with a unit of capital of type k. 
The totality of techniques available is therefore completely specified by the 
function f(k) for k ? 0. For convenience, as well as ease of comparison 
with the malleable capital model, we assume that f is a standard neo- 
classical production function; that is, we assume that f is increasing, 
strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable, and satisfies the end- 
point conditions f(O) = 0, f'(0) = oc, f(oo) < oc, and f'(co) = 0. 
As the techniques available are unchanging over time, at any point in 
time all relevant information about the past behavior of the economy is 
summarized in the available amount of, or, what amounts to the same 
thing, possible employment on capital of each type. In order to allow for 
uneveness in the choices of technique for past investment, it is useful to 
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denote the latter quantities in terms of a distribution rather than a density- 
mass function. Thus, we denote by N(k, t) possible employment on all 
types of capital less than k at time t. In general, N may have unequal left 
and right-hand derivatives (for adjacent types of capital in which there has 
been uneven past investment), flat segments (for an interval of types of 
capital in which there has been no past investment), and even discontinuities 
(for a type of capital in which there has been extensive past investment). 
For the most part, however, we will carry out the analysis under the 
assumption that there are neither flat segments nor discontinuities (in the 
relevant domain of k), merely indicating how the analysis would have to be 
modified otherwise. In particular, for the behavioral hypotheses we will 
consider, this assumption would be satisfied for t ? 0 if it were satisfied 
for t = 0. 
Now, given possible employment at any point in time, N(k,t), efficient 
employment of the labor force at that point, N(t), requires that if a type 
machine k' is used then all machines of the type k > k' be used; otherwise 
the rate of final output could be increased by shifting labor from the 
machine of type k' to some machine of type k > k'. This just means 
that efficient short-run allocation in this economy is fully described by the 
condition 
N(t) = f dN(k, t) = N(oo, t) - N[k(t), t],1 (2.1) 
defining the marginal type of machine utilized k(t). But this condition is 
also just the description of equilibrium in a competitive labor market in 
which the wage rate w(t) is bid to settle at the output-labor ratio of the 
marginal type machine utilized 
w(t) = f[k(t)].2 (2.2) 
1 Clearly we assume that full employment rather than capacity utilization is the 
operative constraint in this economy. If full employment occurs at the upper endpoint 
of a flat segment, say (k', k(t)), or at a discontinuity, then the condition (2.1) becomes 
N(t) = f dN(k, t), (2.1') 
ke(k' ,kt)) 
or 
lim | dN(k, t) < N(t) < lim F dN(k, t). (2.1") 
x -k(t) - -x xk(t) + J 
2 The wage rate will be indeterminate when full employment occurs at the upper 
endpoint of a flat segment. Possible market mechanisms which avoid this indetermin- 
acy may or may not be tractable to analysis, as the sketchy discussion following 
Theorem 3.3 indicates. 
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Moreover, it immediately yields the rate of final output Y(t) as the aggre- 
gate of rates from all types of machine utilized; 
Y(t) = f f(k)dN(k, t) = [f(k)N(k, 0)]~t) -f f'(k)N(k, t)dk. (2.3) 
To complete the model three more elements are required: (1) a labor 
supply function, (2) a description of aggregate saving behavior, and (3) a 
characterization of the choice of technique. 
For the first we adopt the conventional assumption that the labor force 
is supplied inelastically and grows at a constant exogenous rate, 
N(t) = nN(t) with n ? O.' (2.4) 
As usual, this assumption implies that, if all the real variables in this 
economy are now measured in terms of the labor supply, then the only 
substantive effect for the analysis is that all growth rates are reduced by 
n. To gain this simplification we henceforth redefine all real variables, 
including the labor supply itself, to be so measured. 
To describe aggregate saving behavior, in the bulk of the paper we adopt 
the hypothesis that gross saving is the sum of a constant fraction saved from 
profits plus a constant fraction saved from wages: 
I(t) = s1,4Y(t) - w(t)] + sw(t) = snY(t) + (s. - s")w(t) 
with (2.5a) 
0 ? S , 1, 
with special attention devoted to the particular case where these saving 
rates are equal, 0 < s = s, = sW < 1. However, in Part V we shall explore 
the implications of the alternative hypothesis that gross saving is deter- 
mined, say, by a central planning authority, to maximize the discounted 
sum of all future consumption per capita: 
maximize C(t)e-61dt with 8 > 0. (2.5b) 
Finally, regarding the choice of technique we shall consider three 
hypotheses, each assuming that investing units choose the capital-labor 
ratio associated with current investment k(t) to maximize the present value 
of their return, but differing in the manner by which investing units formu- 
late their expectations about future prices, wages, and interest rates. 
These are, in order of their appearance in the sequel, the hypothesis based 
on the most naive formulation of expectations-static expectations; the 
3 Clearly it makes no difference to the analysis if we conceive of the labor supply as 
being measured in efficiency units and accordingly interpret its growth rate as being 
composed of contributions from both expansion of the labor force and improvement 
in labor efficiency. 
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hypothesis based on the most sophisticated formulation of expectations- 
perfect foresight; and an intermediate hypothesis based on a probabilistic 
formulation of expectations. The details of these hypotheses will be discussed 
later. 
Given some aggregate saving behavior, I(t), and some choice of 
technique, kI(t), it is easily seen that the evolution of the employment 
distribution function N(k, t) is given by the partial differential equations: 
N(k, t )
_ AN(k, t), k < k(t); 
kIktt) 
= -AN(k, t) + L(Lt, k > k(t); (2.6) 
where, if we introduce a constant exogenous rate of capital depreciation 
M _ 0, then A = n + y represents the rate of loss of relative employment 
on a machine of any type due to growth of the labor supply and deprecia- 
tion of the capital stock. 
The foregoing system, along with a specification of the initial employ- 
ment distribution function, provides a complete description of the beha- 
vior of the economy over time. Our qualitative analysis of this behavior 
will rely heavily on the following two properties of this system. 
1(t) A 04 27 Property 1: vi(t) = 0 according as -A 0 -4 (2.7) k(t) 
Whether the wage rate is increasing or decreasing depends only on whether 
more or less employment is being supplied by new investment than is 
being demanded by labor force growth and capital stock depreciation. 
Property 2: Y(t) = f[k(t)] k(( - A Y(t) - w(t)F[k(( - (2.8) At) f I' k(t) Lk A] 
This is a similarly interpreted statement about the change in output.5 
When N(k, t) is differentiable at k = k(t), these properties can be derived 
by straightforward differentiation of (2.1) and (2.3), respectively. Thus, 
4 i(t) should be interpreted as 
lir w(t + At) - w(t) 
At-0 + At 
When N(k, t) is not differentiable from the right at k = k(t), Property 1 should read 
w(t + At) - w(t) > 0 according as [I(- k(o]-A > 0 for some E > 0 and all 0 < At 
< E. 
I The statement of both properties assumes k(t) < k(t), that is, the new investment 
is utilized immediately. If this were not the case, then clearly wi < 0 and y = 
-A(y - w). 
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recalling the convention adopted earlier that all variables are measured in 
per capita terms, we obtain upon differentiating (2.1): 
oN(oo, t) aN[k(t), t] __ N[k(t), t] k(t 
at atDi Dk(t) 
I(t) A - N[k(t), t] wi(t) 
k(t) ak(t) f'[k(t)]' 
or 
w~)={[V(0*0)- Allf [k(t)], 
aN[k(t), t 
from which Property 1 follows immediately. Similarly, differentiation of 
(2.3) (and substitution for {aN[k(t), t]/DkQ)}k (t) from above) yields 
Property 2: 
Y(t) =- [kt)] k(t) t+ ?f[k(t)]N[k(t), t]}k(t) + [f(k) at ] 
ak~~~t) kt t 
+ f'[k(t)]N[k(t), t]k(t)- f (k) (k, t dk Jkt)~~~~ 
f [4 1 I - AY(t) - w(t)[L A]. k(t) k(t)- 
When N(k, t) is not differentiable at k = k(t), the story is slightly more 
complicated. Consider first the derivation of (2.7). This follows directly 
from an analysis of the difference quotient for N(t) defined from equation 
(2.1) (again recalling that we have assumed N[t] identically equal to 
one): 
o =k(t+At) dN(k, t + At) - fk(t) dN(k, t) 
At 
{N(oo, t + At) -N[k(t + At), t + At]} 
-{N(oo, t) - N[k(t), t]} ? N[k(t), t + At] 
At 
N(oo, t + At) -N(oo, t) N[k(t), t + At] - N[k(t), t] 
{Nto~ t t ? At )]} 
_ N[k(t + At), t + At] - N[k(t), t + At] (2.9) 
At 
Assuming that k(t) ? k(t), from (2.6) the limit of the first and hence the 
second term in the last expression is just [I(t)/k(t)] - A. But, because by 
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assumption, N(k, t) is strictly increasing near k(t) (that is, N[k, t] has no 
relevant flat segments), this entails the asserted property. 
Property 2 also follows from a consideration of the appropriate differ- 
ence quotient, now for Y(t) defined from equation (2.3). 
Y(t + At) - Y(t) 
At 
_fk(t + At) f(k)dN(k, t + At) - fk(t) f(k)dN(k, t) 
At 
fk(t) f(k)[dN(k, t + At) -dN(k, t)] ? fk(t+ At f(k)dN(k, t + At) 
At 
f(k) dN(k, t + At) -dN(k, t) + f(k) . k(t+At) dN(kA t ? At) 
- .Jk~~~t At ?k)At 
{[fi(k) N(k, t + At) - N(k, ) 0] At Jk(t) 
- '(k) N(k, t + At) - N(k, t) d 
N[k(t + At), t + At] - N[k(t), t + At] 
- f(k) At (2.10) 
for some k between k(t + At) and k(t) by the mean value theorem for 
integrals. But from (2.6) the limit of the first term in the last expression can 
be shown, after some analysis, to be simplyf [k(t)][I(t)/k(t)] - A Y(t), while 
from (2.8) the limit of the second term in the last expression is f[k(t)] 
x {[I(t)/k(t)] - A}. Thus, Property 2 is also verified. 
We should mention that these properties must be modified slightly when 
flat segments or discontinuities in N(k, t) are permitted.6 The really crucial 
point about the present model, however, is that regardless of the complexity 
of past history or present behavior, these properties will enable us to an- 
6 When full employment occurs at the upper endpoint of a flat segment, the re- 
quisite modification depends on the particular market mechanism for avoiding in- 
determinancy in the wage rate which is postulated. When full employment occurs at a 
discontinuity, these properties must be modified to let ii(t) = 0 and Y(t) = f[k(bI 
x [I(t)/k(t)] - A Y(t) whenever 
i) ~~~~lim |dN(k, t) < N(t) < lim |dN(k, t), 
x-k(t) - Jx-k(t) + J 
ii) lim X dN(k, t) = N(t) and I(t) A > 0 
x - Mt) - xk(t) 
or iii) N(t) = lim+ dN(k, t) and - - A < 0. 
SAVING AND EXPECTATIONS HYPOTHESES 593 
alyze the qualitative behavior of the economy as if it were completely 
described by a system of ordinary differential equations (in contrast to the 
rather complicated mixed system of equations by which the economy is 
actually described). 
III. Static Expectations 
In this section we investigate the behavior of the economy when aggregate 
saving behavior is described by (2.5a) and investing units expect future 
wage and interest rates (with final output as the numeraire good) to be the 
same as those prevailing today. 
Consider a representative investing unit which has at the present time t 
one unit of final output to invest. For any machine of type k with f(k) > 
w(t) this unit expects to earn quasi-rents {[f(k) - w(t)]/k}e-#(v-t) at 
any time v > t, while, say, on a government bond costing one unit of final 
output it expects to earn interest r(t) at any time v _ t. (The latter is best 
thought of as a convenient heuristic device for introducing the concept of 
the rate of interest in this context). Hence it can calculate what it believes 
to be the present value of any machine of type k with f(k) > w(t): 
0f f(k) -w(t) e- tr(t) +#](v - t) dv = f(k) - w(t)/[r(t) + at] (3.1) 
k k 
Assuming the unit chooses k(t), the machine of that type which maximizes 
this present value, its choice is simply described by the machine whose ex 
ante marginal productivity of labor g'(k) is equal to the current wage rate 
g [k(t)]f [k(t)] -f '[k(t)]k(t) = w(t), (3.2) 
as by the concavity off: 
d f(k) - w(t)] 
dk w(t)= I g(k) > according as k k(t). 
This means, among other things, that the interest rate which makes the 
investing unit indifferent between capital and bonds, or the present value 
of a machine of type k(t) equal to its cost, must be the net quasi-rent on a 
machine of type k(t), r(t) = [{f[k(t)] - w(t)}/k(t)]- 
Given the aggregate saving behavior (2.5a) and the choice of technique 
(3.2), the qualitative behavior of the economy, summarized by the qualita- 
tive behavior of Y(t) and w(t), depends basically on whether s, > sw (the 
"normal" case) or s, < sa. This can be easily seen from the typical phase 
diagrams for the two cases (Fig. 1), or, better yet, from the extreme phase 
diagrams for the two cases (Fig. 2). In brief, we can derive the following 
conclusions: (1) if sn > sw, then the economy converges asymptotically to 
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ta. =~W .- 
w, c, W* w 'W* W2* ws w 
a. on<sW<nr5 b. ocSTT c <S 
FIG. 1 
a unique balanced growth path, possibly through continued reinvestment 
cycles; (2) if s, = sw, then the economy also converges to a unique 
balanced growth path, but through at most one-half of a single reinvest- 
ment cycle; and (3) if s, < su,, then the economy converges to possibly 
one of several balanced growth paths, again through at most one-half of a 
single reinvestment cycle. 
These conclusions follow directly from an analysis of the properties 
w0 Y "0 
w w w 
a O=Sw<S74- b. O(<Si=Sw<1 C. O=STr <SWi 
FIG. 2 
7 "Reinvestment cycle" is a shorthand reference to oscillation in both Y and w. 
The choice of terminology is dictated by the fact that in this model, the possibility 
of continued oscillation is associated with a larger share of profits than wages being 
saved (s, > sm). Notice from Fig. lb that in the opposite case (s, < sw) either Y(t) 
or w(t), but not both together, may oscillate over some limited period. 
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described in Part II, (2.7) and (2.8), under the hypotheses (2.5a) and (3.2),8 
which we rewrite for this purpose as (hereafter suppressing the time 
variable t when no confusion may result from doing so): 
I S_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
__SO wi 0, according as A - A Y (s +, (3.3) kk 
and 
Y= f~k) k-AY- - A) = [sAfA(k) - A](Y - w) + swf'(k)w, 
(3.4) 
where 
k = g''(w), with dw g""(k) = f"(k)i > 0. (3.5) 
Consider first (3.3). By utilizing the properties off and the relation (3.5), 
we find that 
- (sn - s)ww + Ak 
_s'f(k)k + s~w - Ak 
k~~~~~~ fl) , (3.6) 
lim (Y),'0 = 0, 
w-O 
lim 
_ 0 Y =lim (z ) -f'(k)] +-k= oo; (3.7) 
W -+ 00 00 \S' Ik JS, 
(Y SY -SW + A dk (3.8) 
\dw~w~o S, sdw' 
and 
if w = 0 at (Y', w'), then w $ 0 at (Y ", w'), according as Y" > Y'. (3.9) 
Similarly, from (3.4) we find that 
if Y= 0(and Y> w),thenk > ki(orw > v)wheres,,f'(k) = A 
[or w = g'(k)]; (3.10) 
( y)=o= [1 snf '(k) - A] (3.11) 
lim ( Y)k = c =o, lim ( Y)k = 0 = x; (3.12) 
w -jbV+ w_- CO 
8 Our analysis assumes 0 < s,, sw. The limiting cases sw = 0 and s, = 0, as can 
be seen from Figs. 2a and 2c, are essentially extreme examples of the general cases 
s, > sw, and s, < sw, respectively. 
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(dK) - - swf'(k) A]I+ Aswwf"(k) dk 
dw k.= snf(k)- [sj'(k) - A]2 dw 
w ?s k) - A] [ f '(k)k ; (3.13) 
and 
if YI = O at (Y', w'), then 0 g at (Y", w'), according as Y" Z Y'. (3.14) 
Finally, using (3.3) in evaluating (3.4) yields the result that 
vi = O and Y= Oif and only if 
( )Y~w= o = (Y)=0 = f(k) for k > k (or w > fv-). (3.15) 
Given these preliminary results, we come to the core of the argument, 
which can be succinctly expressed in three propositions: 
Theorem 3.1 
If s,, > sW, then there exists a unique balanced growth path (Y*, w*, k*); 
if s" < sW, then there exists at least one balanced growth path and possibly 
several balanced growth paths (Y*, w*, kl*) ... (Y*, w*, k*) where m ? 1. 
Proof 
By virtue of the second right-hand expression in (3.6) and the result (3.15), 
we need only show that the function 
h(w) = snf'(k)k + sww - Ak (3.16) 
has a single zero for w E(W, xo) when sn _ sW, or at least a single zero and 
possibly several zeros for w E(W, xe), when sn < sW. But this conclusion 
follows immediately from the facts that 
lim h(w) = sww, 
lim h(w) = lim (s [f)- f'(k)] + [s4 '(k) - A]}k -x; wba+ 00 k- c k 
and 
h'(w) = [sf'(k) - A + snf"(k)k] w + Sw = [sdwf'(k)-A] + (SW- 
as the last is unambiguously negative for we[0, ox) only if sn _ sW. 
Theorem 3.2 
If s" > sW (s7, = sw), then there is a w' > w* (w' = w*) such that (dY/dw)k= 
0, according as w w'; if s:, < sw then (dY/dw)yk0 > 0 whenever 
,Y- ,o < (k r(, 0 
,A 
fi^ 
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This proposition describes the circumstances under which there can be 
oscillation in Y: The first part simply means that Y oscillates if and only if 
w oscillates when s, > sw (Y cannot oscillate when s, = s ), as by (3.8) 
(dY/dw)- =0 > 0 for sn > sw. The second part is somewhat more compli- 
cated; its essence, however, is that if Y oscillates, then w must be increasing 
when sn < sw, as by (3.5) (dY/dw)yf(j) > 0. This result rules out con- 
tinued oscillation in Y when s, < si,,. Both parts are illustrated in the 
exaggerated blowups of portions of Fig. 1 in Fig. 3 below. 
Proof 
Let k > k (or w > iv) be defined by s4f(k) = Ak (or w' = g'(k)). Then, from 
the second right-hand expression in (3.6) and the result (3.15) we have, 
if s, = sw, then (Y*, w*, k*) = (5 Y k). 
Moreover, from (3.1 1) we have 
_Ky)_=___ _ Wf(k) 0> 
bsw srf '(k) - A 
which together with 
[d A = (k) > '0, 
implies if sn > sw, then (Y*, w*, k*) < (Y. w, k), or if Sn < sw, then 
(Yi*, w*, k*) > (Yw, k) for i = 1, . . . , m. The first part of the proposi- 
tion now follows directly from the results, the details of whose derivation 
we omit, if Sn > sw (sn = sw), then 
(dY) <0(=0) for w =w* 
> 0 for w > w; 
Y Y Y=o 
Ye '(=0 - - -~Y3*- = y Y 3 X o 
X I I L ~ ~ ~~~~~~I I 
W* W W WI I W 
^, S r > SW b. SIT <FSW 
FIG. 3 




> 0>0 for w < W. 
Similarly, the second part follows from the results, whose details we also 
omit, if Sn < s, then (Y)-=o < f(k) for w < w*, and (DY/dw>)=0 > 0 
for w ? wi and either (Y)>=o < f(k) or (Y)W=o ? f(k). 
Theorem 3.3 
If s7 > sw, then 
lim [Y(t), w(t), k(t)] = (Y*, w*, k*). 
It should be clear that convergence to a balanced growth path when s, 
< sw is assured by the fact that continued oscillation in Y or w is 
impossible. 
Proof 
We must show that periodic or undamped oscillation around the balanced 
growth path is impossible. The proof involves a contradiction. Suppose at 
time t' > 0 we observe Y1(t') > 0 and vi(t') = O at [ Y(t'), w(t')] = (Y', w') 
< (Y*, w*) (see Fig. la above). Now periodic or undamped oscillation 
would require both this and that at some later time t" > t' Y(t") < Y' 
and w(t") = w' with w(t) > w' for t' < t < t". Suppose then that the latter 
is also the case. Then static expectations (3.5) imply that k(t) > k' for 
t' ? t < t". In addition the properties (3.3) and (3.4) imply that 
YAt') =f Ik(t')] k(t 1)-Yt)>it'= k(t')-A=O 
orf(k') > Y'. Utilizing these facts along with the underlying technological 
relationships (2.1), (2.3), and (2.6), we see that the following must be true: 
Y(t") = f(k)dN(k, t") 
= J f(k)[dN(k, t") -dN(k, t')e -A(t"- t')] + f f(k)dN(k, t')e- - 
> f(k') 1 [dN(k, t") - dN(k, t')e-A(t" -t')] + Y'e (t"t') 
k'W 
= f(k')[1 - e A(t -ti)] + Y'e-A(t"-t') > y, 
as, if k(t) > k' for t' ? t < t", then dN(k, t") -dN(k, t')e A(t"t') 0 for 
k < k'. But this contradicts the original hypothesis that Y(t") < Y'. 
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A few general comments about the foregoing results are appropriate. 
First, we note that the behavior of this economy is considerably richer than 
the behavior of the analogous economy with malleable capital. In particu- 
lar, though in the long run the two are indistinguishable (as along a 
balanced growth path, static expectations are in fact fulfilled), in the short 
run there is very likely to be some degree of oscillation in significant 
variables here which is impossible there. This difference is clearly quite 
strongly related to the fact that the profile as well as the aggregate of past 
behavior impinges on current behavior in this economy and is apparently 
somewhat weakly related to the particular behavioral hypotheses adopted 
(as Part IV illustrates). 
Second, we mention that stable long-run behavior in this economy 
depends crucially on the assumption that the exogenous technological in- 
fluences, capital depreciation and technical change, are exponential. For 
example, if capital depreciation were abrupt, then replacement cycles 
would very likely reinforce reinvestment cycles to keep the economy in a 
perpetual state of oscillation. This observation also suggests that if these 
factors were made endogenous, then they might also tend to destabilize 
the behavior of the economy. 
Finally, we outline how either flat segments or discontinuities in the 
initial employment distribution function N(k, 0) affect our results. For 
example, consider the borderline case s, = sw, and assume, first, that there 
is a flat segment for kE(k', k(O)), that is, that there are initially no machines 
of type kE(k', k(O)), and then, second, there is a discontinuity at k = k(0), 
that is, that there is initially a mass of machines of type k = k(O), as 
depicted in Figure 4 for { Y(O), f(k(0))} < ( Y*, w*).9 
When there is a flat segment for kE(k', k(O)), so that w(O) could fall 
anywhere betweenf(k') andf(k(O)), the natural choice for the initial wage 
rate is that value which entails an unambiguous determination of its later 
development; for instance, in Figure 4a we depict the two possibilities for 
{ Y(0),f(k(0))} < (Y*, w*). On the one hand, there does not seem to be any 
appealing economic argument to justify this particular choice. On the other, 
however, it should not be surprising that the natural choice is at the same 
time an artificial one; this sort of difficulty pervades equilibrium theory.10 
When there is a discontinuity at k = k(O), things are much simpler: w 
just remains constant at f(k(O)) for some period (0, t'). The length of this 
period t' corresponds roughly to the time it takes to build new machines to 
I The more general situation where the flat segment or discontinuity becomes rele- 
vant at some time t' > 0 can be analyzed in a similar fashion once investment during 
the period (0, t') is accounted for. 
10 If we follow Marshall's dictum, then the market mechanism appropriate in this 
dynamic context, gradual rather than abrupt adjustment of the wage rate toward an 
equilibrating level, avoids an indeterminate wage rate but introduces an unstable one 
(to say nothing of Keynesian unemployment). 
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replace those of type k(O), or the time it takes for population growth and 
depreciation to force full utilization of machines of type k(O). These two 
situations are depicted by the development of the economy from {VY(O), 
f(k(O))} < (Y*, w*) and {y2(0), f(k(O))} < (Y*, w*), respectively, in 
Figure 4b. 
IV. Perfect Foresight 
In Part III the investor based his decision on what type of machines to 
construct on very naive expectations: he assumed that the wage today 
would continue indefinitely far into the future. In Part IV we consider the 
other polar case: the individual is assumed to have perfect foresight, that is, 
the wage and interest rates he expects today for any given date in the future 
will in fact be the wage and interest rates at that time. In other words, we 
consider equilibrium paths, paths along which, if individuals act on their 
expectations, those expectations are fulfilled. 
Let us consider the price system as viewed at time zero. We denote the 
instantaneous rate of return by r(t), and let 
R(t)= fr(&)dr. (4.1) 
Throughout this analysis we shall assume that there is some investment and 
some consumption going on at every point of time. Thus, competitive 
equilibrium requires that the price of output must equal the price of con- 
sumption which must equal the market price of the type of capital good 
being constructed at that time. If we let output be the numeraire, then the 
price of output at time t as viewed at time 0 is simply 
p(t) = e Rt) (4.2) 
The price of output at time v as viewed at time t is simply 
p(v, t) = p(v)/p(t) = e-[R(V)-R(t)]. (4.3) 
The demand price for a capital good of type k at time t is 
q(k, t) = f(k) - w(v) p(v, t)dv, (4.4) 
A(k, t) k 
where A is defined as the set of intervals over which the machine is used, 
that is, 
A(k, t) = [vlv _ t; w(v) ? f(k)]. (4.5) 
It is sometimes convenient to write (4.4) in a slightly different form: 
q(k, t) = i(kt) f(k)- w(v) p(v, t)dv, (4.6) 
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where vzi(k, t) is defined as the ith value of v > t for which 
lim w(v) < f(k), 
v-ij(k,t) - 
and 
lim w(v) ? f(k). 
v- tq(k,t) + 
Similarly, for k > k, vi(k, t) is defined as the (i - 1)th value of v > t for 
which 
lim w(v) ? f(k) 
v -vi(k ,t - 
and 
lim w(v) ? f(k) for i > 2, 
v-vj(k,t) + 
and as t for i = 1. (For k < k, vi[k, t] is defined symmetrically with 
vi[k, t].) Graphically, these definitions can be simply represented as in 
Figure 5. 
The type of machine with the highest demand price is built, since, by 
assumption, the costs of building all machines are identical. Thus, again 
denoting this type of machine by k, it must be that 
(k ) A { ( ) Lfk) -kf'k] &q[c 
t)-f(2t f')]}(v, t)dv =0 ;11 (4.7) 
or 




I I l ~ ~~~~ I 
I I I . 
t iW(klt) V2l,) v(k,t) V 
FIG. 5 
"It is easy to show that this derivative exists and has the indicated value, even if 
w(v) is not continuous (or differentiable), since either the value of the integrand at the 
limits of integration in (4.4) is zero or the limits of integration in (4.4) are invariant to 
small changes in k. 
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The "weighted average" wage must equal the marginal product of labor. 
A sufficient condition for the uniqueness of k is the negativity of 
a2q(k, t) _ 2 w - g'(k) p(v, t)dv + f"(k) p(v, t)dv 
JA(k,t) k JA(kt) k 
:_{w[vj(k, t)]- g'(k)}p[vj(k, t), t] dv2(k, t) (48 
2{w[v?3(k, t)]- g'(k)}p[vi3(k, t), t] D3(k t) 
+ 2k 
where, as before, g'(k) = f(k) - kf'(k). Note that the first term, by (4.7), 
is zero if k = k. The second term is unambiguously negative. But the last 
two terms are unambiguously positive, since w[vi(k, t)] = f(k), and 
w[i3i(k, t)] = f(k).12 Hence, we cannot rule out the possibility that there 
exists more than one k that could be constructed at any given time, that is, 
such that 
q(k, t) = max {q(k, t)}. 
kO 
Later on we shall show that, over any interval of time, there can exist at 
most two such types of machines. For the moment we shall simply assume 
that only one type of machine is built at any time (and that k[t] is con- 
tinuous). 
As we have already indicated, since there is always some consumption 
and some investment going on, competitive equilibrium requires that 
q (k, t ) f) A p(v, t)dv = 1. (4.9) 
A(k,t) k 
Subtracting (4.7), we obtain 
1 = Lk f'(k)p(v, t)dv. (4.10) 
A(k It) 
Notice that (4.10) is identical to the corresponding expression for 
perfectly malleable capital; the price of capital is equal to the discounted 
quasi-rents, which in the malleable capital case is justf '(k): 
00 
1 Jt f'[k(v)]p(v, t)dv. 
The behavior of the economy is completely described by equations 
(4.1)-(4.10) and the equations in output and employment, which are 
12 Except if at a given vi, w(v) is not differentiable or continuous. If w(v) is differen- 
tiable everywhere except at points of discontinuities, then we sum only over those i's 
at which w(v,) is continuous. If w(v) is not differentiable at some points at which it is 
continuous, the analysis goes through with the appropriate limit operations. 
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identical to those of the previous sections (eq. [2.1] and [2.3]). We shall 
assume a constant proportion of income, s, is saved. 
As before, the behavior may be more easily analyzed in the difference- 
differential form rather than the integral form. 
Differentiating (4.4), we obtain a differential equation for the demand 
price of a machine of type k: 
4(k, t) = r(t) f(k) - w~t) (4.11) 
q (k, t) kq(k, t) (.1 
By differentiating (4.7) we obtain an equation describing the change in 
the type of machine constructed :13 
a2q(/X t) k + r(t) aq(k: t) w(t) - [f(k) - kf'(k)] = 
or 
w [f (k) kf - (k) k 2 8q(k, t) 
Since, by the second-order condition, the denominator is negative, 
sign k = sign [f(k) - kf'(k) w] (4.12) 
As before (Part II), 
sign wP = sign [-A + (sYlk)] (4.13) 
and 
f aN(k t) 
Y a (~k) ww ak 
_ = -A + I - Yf'(k) 
AW [f(k) - w 
= -A + + s w] (4.14) 
Dynamic Behavior 
We now analyze the dynamic behavior of the economy. We will continue 
the analysis with the assumptions that only one type of machine is con- 
structed at any time and that k(t) is continuous. Later, these assumptions 
will be lifted. 
13 Even if (82q)/(ak2) does not exist, the sign of k can be shown to be that of 
g'()- w, by arguments similar to those used in Part II. 
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We will first show that Y must converge to Y*, where, as before, Y* - 
f(k*) with sf(k*) = Ak*. We will then show that k must converge to k* 
and w to w*. In establishing that all perfect foresight paths must converge 
to balanced growth, we will, moreover, be able to determine what the 
dynamic path looks like. 
Lemma 1 
If Y is ever non-positive, it is always non-positive. Evaluating [d( 5/ Y)/dt] 
at Y= 0, we obtain, 14 
[d(Y!)] = +sw-(k)]k 
[dt ] =O o [Y k] k 
since, as we have already noted, the sign of vi is identical to that of - A + 
(s Y/k), while the sign of k is the same as g'(k)- w. 
Lemma 2 
If Y < Y*5 Y > 0. Since 7Y is a function of w, k, and Y, we have Y/Y= 
O(w, k, Y). In Part III, we showed that if w = g'(k), Y > 0 if Y < Y*. If 
i < 0 and Y < Y*, w cannot equal g'(k) and 1(w, k, Y) < 0[g'(k), k, Y]. 
Since (ab/Dw) = A - (s Y/k), if at some time r, Y ? 0 and Y < Y*, then 
k ? 0 w(r) g' [k(r)] -b/ea w ? 0 A - (sYlk) ? 0 v(r) $ 0. 
If w(r) > g'[k(r)], k must remain negative until w(t) = g'[k(t)] < w(-), 
so wi must become negative before k can become positive. But if wi < 0, 
Y_ 0, by (4.14), since k(t) < k(T) < sY/A < sY*/A = k*. But this 
contradicts Lemma 1. Hence vw(t) > 0 and k(t) < 0 for all t > T, so w(t) 
- g'[k(t)] > 0 for all t ? i, that is, {A[k(z),T] {w(v) - g'[k(T)]}p(v, ir)dv > 0. 
But this contradicts the perfect foresight assumption. 
If w(r) < g'[k(r)], k must remain positive until w(t) = g'[k(t)] > w(r), 
so vw must become positive before k can become negative. But by Lemma 1, 
Y/Y < 0; sinceik > 0, A - [sY(t)/k(t)] > A - [sY( )k(r)] > 0 so vi(t) < 0 
for all t ? r. But, again, this is inconsistent with perfect foresight. 
Similarly, it is easy to establish some further qualitative properties of the 
behavior of income per capita. If Y = Y*, but k :A k*, then Y > 0. 
If Y = Y* and k = k*, then Y- 0. In Figure 6 we have reproduced 
the phase diagram from Part III. The curve AEC is the locus of Y = 0 
when w = g'(k), and OEB is the locus of vw = 0 when w = g'(k). Above 
14 If the derivative of Y/ Y does not exist, we take the appropriate limit of the differ- 
ence quotient. 
6o6 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
y A D B C 
Y - - F EG 
IH 0 w* w 
FIG. 6 
AEC, Y < 0. To see this, observe that D(Y/ Y)/Dk = s[w-g'(k)]/k2. Let 
k be such that w = g'(k). If k = k, we have already established I < 0, in 
Part III. If k > k, that is, w < g'(k), we can write 
/(w, k, Y) = /(w, k, Y) + oak(wk Y) dk < 0. 
Similarly, for k < k. 
We now establish the usual result: 
Lemma 3 
lim sup Y _ Y* = f(k)dN(k, t) _ f(k)dN(k, t) _ f(K) 
t -+ axk 
(by concavity), where 
K= kdN(k, t). 
ButK= -AK + sY _ -AK + sf(K) so lim sup K ? K* where sf(K*) = 
t Ad c 
AK*, so lim sup Y ? f(K*) = AK*/s = Y*. 
t-. 
Our stability theorems follow almost immediately. 
Theorem 4.1 
Lim Y= Y*. 
t em 0 
Either there exists a time t at which Y > Y*, or there does not. If there 
does not, since Y > 0 for Y < Y*, Yis monotonic and bounded, and thus 
must approach a limit. But again, since Y > 0 for Y < Y*, the limit must 
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be Y*. If at some time Y > Y*, by Lemmas 1 and 3, there must be a time 
after which 1 is always negative. But by Lemma 2, if Y is ever greater than 
Y*, it can never be less than Y*. Since Y is thus bounded below by Y*, 
and is monotonically decreasing after some time, it must approach a limit, 
greater than or equal to Y*. But by Lemma 3, lim sup Y < Y*, so 
lim Y= Y*. 
Theorem 4.2 
Lim k = k*, lim w = w*. 
t- o t- 
Suppose lim N (k, t) = 1 for k > k*, 0 for k ? k*. Then, since f(k) is 
t - co 
strictly concave, for some E > 0 and all T < so, there is a t ? T such that 
Y(t) ? f(K*) - E, again in contradiction to Theorem 4.1. Hence, 
lim k = V. 
But since by assumption k is continuous, if 
lim k =k 
t _+ a) 
by (4.12), then 
lim w = W*. 
We now establish some properties about the movements in k(t), the type 
of machine constructed at time t. 
Property 4.1 
In the region above OED (see phase diagram) g'(k) > w, that is, k > 0; 
in the region below HEB, g'(k) _ w, that is k ? 0. Consider the region 
above OED. Assume that there existed a time - at which g'[k(i-)] < w(-r). 
Then for all t > T, g'[k(t)] < w(t). In OED, if g'(k) < w, wi > 0. Since 
k(T) < 0, for k to become non-negative there must exist a t for which wi 
must become negative before k can become positive. But if vw = 0, Y > 0, 
since k(t) < k(r) < g-I[w(r)] < k* (and irlY = [sf(k)/k] - A if vw = 0); 
since Y is increasing and k decreasing iw' > 0. So wi' ? 0 always. But then 
{g'[k(T)] - w(v)}p(v, -r)dv < 0, 
c[t(tp , T i 
contrary to the perfect foresight profit maximization assumption. 
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The other case may be handled in exactly the same manner. An im- 
mediate consequence of this is that the economy can only cross the line OE 
from the right and below, and BE from the left and above. Assume it 
crossed OE from the left. When it reached OE, at a wage of w, k > k, 
where g'(k) = w. But that would mean that vi < 0, and since Y > 0, 
that would mean that the trajectory crosses back into the region to the left 
of OE. Similarly for BE. 
Similarly, we establish the following properties of wage movements. 
Property 4.2 
In OED, if k > k*, w> 0; in BEH, ifk < k*, vw < 0. In OED assume at 
some time i-, k(r) - k*, and vi(ir) ? 0. Then w falls forever. Assume vi = 0. 
Then 1 < 0, k > 0, so ii(t) < 0. But this means that 
{w - g' [k(r)]}p(v, r)dv =# 0, AMkT), T] 
violating the perfect foresight profit maximization assumption. Similarly 
for BEH. 
Property 4.3 
In FED, vi > 0. In GEH, vi < 0. 
In FED, if k > kA*, vi > 0 by Property 4.2. If k < k* A + (s Y/k) > 
-A + (s Y*/k*) = 0, so vi > 0. Similarly for GEH. 
With this information we can delineate five possible kinds of trajectories: 
(1) An economy can begin with k < 0 (below HEG); at some time switch 
from k < 0 to k > 0 (in OEH), cross OE, and switch back again to k < 0 
after crossing DE. (2) An economy can begin with k < 0 and switch to 
k > 0, as in (1), but never switch back. (3) An economy can begin with 
k < 0 and never switch. (4) An economy can begin with k > 0 and switch 
as in (1) to k < 0. (5) An economy can begin with k > 0 and never switch. 
(See Fig. 7.) 
Discontinuities in k(t) and Construction of Many Types of Machines 
In the previous discussion we explicitly assumed that there was at any 
moment of time a single type of machine whose demand price was greater 
than or equal to that for all other kinds of machines. This assumption is 
likely to be satisfied for paths near balanced growth, since then any 
machine constructed can be used forever, and it is only obsolescence that 
results in the multiplicity of k. But this assumption is not satisfied on all 
paths. Fortunately, most of the previous analysis carries through with only 




slight modification. Again, our strategy will be to discover certain qualita- 
tive properties of the system which will not only provide us with informa- 
tion about the economy's evolution over time but will also enable us to 
prove convergence to the balanced growth path. 
First, we prove that over any interval of time at most two "kinds" (in 
the sense defined below) of machines may be produced simultaneously. 
We define k,(r) and k/(r) by 
I4(r) = mm [k f(k)- w -f (k)-w 
k(r) = mi I k k 
k& = a kf(k) - w _f(k~) - w 
where k = min [k I q(k, r) = 1]; that is, we define the two types of 
machines with quasi-rent equal to the quasi-rent on the least capital- 
intensive machine with price 1. In particular this entails g'(k1) < w < g'(k2) 
when k1 :# k2. (See Fig. 8.) Since 
4(k, t) 4(k, t) f(k) - w f(k) - w 
q(k, t) q(k, ) kq(k, t) kq(k, t) 
the only types of machines that can be constructed at t + At (At arbitrarily 
small) are k ? k1 and k ? k2. It immediately follows that if we produce at 
time t two kinds of machines k/(t) and k2(t), and over an interval (t, t + At) 
we produce two kinds, such that for any r in the interval 
Um r ki(,T+ Ar) - kt() |=O, i =1 2 
AT-O 
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then 
f[1 4()] - w(r) _f2(k2()] W(r) 
k1( r) k2(r) 
for all r in the interval. 
We shall focus in the rest of the discussion on the "normal" cases where 
no machines of type k ? k* exist initially, and therefore Y < Y*, and 
w < w*. (It should be clear, however, that the method of analysis is 
equally applicable to other initial conditions.) 
Before proving that the system is stable, we note the following important 
relations between k1, k2, and w:15 
If k2 < 0 and vw > 0, then k1 > 0. 
If k2 > 0 and vi <<0, then k1 <0. 
if k1 <0 and vw >0, thenk2 > 0 
if k1 >0 and vw < 0, then k2 < 0. 
We now show that if Y < Y*, w cannot become greater than w*. Assume 
at some time row Y(Tro) < Y* and w(rO) = w*. If ii(-ro) > 0, k1Qro) < k*, 
then k2(rO) > k*. For vi to remain positive, k1 must be constructed, so 14 
< 0 and k2 > 0. Eventually w must return to less than w*, since otherwise 
[w - g(kl)]p(v, t)dv > 0. 
A(kt) 
For vi to become negative, either: 
a) Y ? Y*, and k2 is constructed, 42 > 0, and 14 < 0; or 
15 Throughout this section, k, < 0 is to be read A is decreasing, etc., not necessarily 
implying that kA(t) is differentiable. 
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b) Y < Y*, 1 _ 0. Since up to the time that vw < 0, k1 was constructed, 
k, < 0; for v' < 0, k2 must be constructed, k2 > 0, and k1 < 0; or 
c) Y < Y*, Y < 0.16 If 4k only were constructed, for Y < O. V > O. 
So again k2 is constructed, k2 > 0, and k, < 0. 
Since k2 is being constructed as w returns to the value g'[kl(,r)] < w* 
and k2 > k*, we must again eventually exceed wO. But for wi to be positive, 
either: 
a) Y ? Y*, and k, is constructed, so k1 < 0, k2 > 0; or 
b) Y > Y*, k _ 0. Since up to the time that vi > 0, k2 was constructed, 
and k2 > 0, for v' > 0, k1 must be constructed, k2 > 0, and k1 < 0; 
or 
c) Y < Y*, Y> 0. If k2 only were constructed, for Y > 0, vw < 0. 
So again k, is constructed, k2 > 0, and k1 < 0. 
Thus, vw must continue to oscillate around w*; as it does this k2 rises and 
k, falls. Moreover, since at least one of these is changing at a rate bounded 
away from zero, for some finite -T > r0, g[14()] > f[14(i)] > w(t). But 
that means that the economy's wage cannot exceed f[k1(t)], since to do so 
requires the construction of k1(i), but since no new machines of type k1(f) 
are added to production, vi(t) < 0. But this means 
fAX2.) [w -g'(k2)] p(v, t)dv #& 0, 
A(k2 . t 
for some k2 constructed previously, so this could not have been a perfect 
foresight path. 
Similarly it can be shown that Y < Y*; for Y to be greater than Y*, at 
some time the k constructed must be greater than P*. Since w < w, 
k1 < kP, and the analysis proceeds as above. 
Convergence of Y to Y* is now easy to establish. If Y < Y*, Y cannot 
be negative, since that would imply that, if k1 alone were constructed, vw 
> 0; if k2 alone were constructed, vw < 0. But, as earlier, this leads to an 
inconsistency.'7 Since Y < Y*, Y must then converge to Y*. But since 
the type of machine constructed is less than or equal to k*, for Y to con- 
verge to Y*, k must converge to k*, and w must converge to wO. 
16 As before, it is possible to show that if Y _ 0 ever, it is always less than or equal 
to zero. Y is not defined only if iw is not defined; see above, Part II. 
17 For ki continues to fall, k2 continues to rise; eventually either g'(k2) > w*, or 
f(k,) < g'(k2)- 
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Stability of the Pricing System 
A great deal of attention has been focused recently on the instability of the 
pricing system in growth models with heterogeneous capital goods. In 
particular, Hahn (1966) has shown that under some simple saving assump- 
tions and short-run perfect foresight with perfect capital markets (that is, 
where all capital goods yield the same rate of return) for any given initial 
capital endowments, not all initial price vectors lead to balanced growth. 
This result was strengthened by Shell and Stiglitz (1967) who showed in the 
context of a very simple model that there was a unique set of initial prices 
which could lead to balanced growth. But they then pointed out that for all 
other initial prices, at some finite time in the future, the perfect foresight 
assumption would be violated. The results of this section support that 
result: there are initial price systems (that is, q(k, 0)) for which the economy 
does not converge to balanced growth (for simple initial employment 
distributions, for all but one). However, these are inconsistent with perfect 
foresight holding at every moment of time. To put it another way, all 
equilibrium paths must converge to balanced growth. 
V. Optimal Saving 18 
Thus far we have assumed that the economy is composed of decentralized 
decision makers. Suppose now that all decision making is centralized 
in the hands of a planning authority whose objective is to allocate final 
output between consumption and investment, and investment over the 
available techniques, to maximize the discounted stream of future con- 
sumption per capita: 
C(t)e-'tdt with 8 > 0, (5.1) 
subject to a subsistence level constraint 
0 < C ? C(t) ? Y(t).19 (5.2) 
18 A much more complete investigation of the sort of model sketched in this 
section is being carried out by Calvo (1967). 
19 This objective can be rewritten as maximize 
U[C(t)]e-6tdt with 5 > 0, (5.1') 
where 
U(C){_ -cx0, for C < C 
= -?, for C C. 
Such an instantaneous utility function is one approximation to the general instan- 
taneous utility function satisfying U'(C) > 0 with 
lim U'(C) = oo and U"(C) ? 0. 
c-+o 
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As might be expected, the path chosen by the planning authority is closely 
related to the perfect foresight paths analyzed in Part IV, but with a major 
difference: not only must the choice of technique be profit maximizing for 
a certain system of prices, aggregate saving must be output-value maximiz- 
ing at those same prices. 
To be more precise, let p(t) now represent the value of a unit of invest- 
ment at time t in terms of consumption per capita at time 0 or, more 
simply, the present value of a unit of investment at time t (so that [p(t)e6t] 
represents the value of a unit of investment at time t in terms of consump- 
tion per capita at time t, or, simply, the value of a unit of investment at 
time t). Notice that p(t) [p(t)et] need not equal e-6 t [1], the present value 
[value] of a unit of consumption per capita at time t. Moreover, it should 
be clear that the present value [value] of a unit of final output at time t is 
P(t) = max [e-6t, p(t)]{p(t)e6t = max [1, p(t)e6t]}. 
Finally, let P(t)w(t)[P(t)w(t)et] be the present value [value] of a unit of 
labor at time t. 
Now, for any given system of these prices we can define the present 
value [value] of a machine of type k at time t, analogously to (4.4), by 
f(k) - w(v) e-A(v-t)dV. 20 q(k, t)e-6t 
=fAV,) fk) - w.3 A(k, t) 
Also, given any such system of demand prices q(k, t), for a given feasible 21 
path, say, denoted prime, we can define the value of the capital stock at 
time t by 
0r 
V'(t) = q(k, t)kdN'(k, t). (5.4) 
From an argument parallel to that justifying (2.8), we can show that the 
value V'(t) evolves according to the equation :22 
V'(t) - V'(t) = q[k"(t), t]I'(t) - f(t)e 6t [d(k) -w(t)]WN(k, t). 
(5.5) 
20 The reason A rather than I appears in this definition is that consumption per 
capita at time 0 (time t) is the numeraire. 
21 
"Feasible" is taken to mean behavior which satisfies the full employment and 
output equations (2.1) and (2.3) for some specification of aggregate saving and choice 
of technique given the initial employment distribution function. 
22 For ease of notation, which is bad enough as is, we assume that at each instant 
there is only one type of machine 2'(t) being built; the argument when there are a 
finite number of types of machines being built is a straightforward generalization. 
While even the latter is not as general as permitted by the underlying technology, it is 
certainly broad enough to encompass the interesting economic implications of such a 
technology. 
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Along an optimal path (5.5) simply says that change in the value of the 
capital stock is equal to investment plus capital gains (see also the dis- 
cussion of eq. 7.7 below). 
With these preliminary definitions in hand we can characterize the 
behavior induced by the planning authority in two propositions: the first 
states sufficient conditions for optimal saving behavior; the second de- 
scribes (at least in a neighborhood of balanced growth) actual behavior 
satisfying these conditions. 
Theorem 5.1 
Suppose we can find prices p*(t) and w*(t) and a feasible path, also denoted 
asterisk, which satisfy the following conditions: 
i) C*(t) maximizes C(t) + p*(t)e6t[Y*(t) -C(t)] subject to 
C < C(t) ? Y*(t); 
ii) f[k*(t)] = w*(t); 
iii) q*(k, t) ? p*(t)e t with equality for k = k*(t); and 
iv) lim V*(t)e - 6=0. 
Then this path maximizes (5.1) subject to (5.2). 
Note that the theorem goes through for a variable discount rate 8(t) as 
well. From this fact it is easily argued that along the perfect foresight paths 
of Part IV, if s is low enough so that f'(k*) - A > 0, that is, the long-run 
private rate of return is greater than the population growth rate, then the 
social rate of return on investment is equal to the private rate of return, 
that is, the perfect foresight path maximizes 
p(t)C(t)dt, 
where p(t) is again given by (4.2). (The border-line cases 8 = 0 and f'(k*) 
- A = 0 can also be included if one adopts the "Ramsey device" of 
Koopmans [1965] or the "overtaking criterion" of von Weizsicker [1965].) 
A similar point was made by Solow, Tobin, von Weizsicker, and Yaari 
(1966) for the vintage model with ex ante rigid complementarity but 
Harrod neutral embodied technical progress. 
Proof 
The first condition of the theorem may be rewritten: 
if p*(t) < e-t, then C*(t)= Y*(t); 
if p*(t) = eat, then C ? C*(t) ? Y*(t); (5.6) 
if p*(t) > eat, then C = C*(t). 
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Now consider the evaluation of any feasible path satisfying the subsistence 
level constraint (5.2) given by the objective function (5.1): 
C'(t)e 6t= J {C'(t)e-"t + p*(t) f(k)dN'(k, t) - Y'(t) 
+ p*(t)w*(t)I - Jk dN'(k, t)] }dt 
J [e-6t - p*(t)]C'(t)dt + f p*(t) 
x {L [f(k) - w*(t)]dN'(k, t) - I'(t) dt 
+ 3 *(t)w*(t)dt 
[e-6t - p*(t)]C'(t)dt 
r r Pf ~- 1 tw*(t)] 
+ J p*(t) J [f(k) - w*(t)]dN'(k, t)dt 
+ 3'{q* (t), tle 6t- 
+ 3'{3() 'w() [f(k) - w*(t)]dN'(k, t) 
0~~~~~[*0 
- q* [k(t), t ]etI (t) dt 
+ 3'j*(t)w*(t)dt, (5.7) 
(utilizing [5.5] to simplify the fourth term of the preceding expression), 
= '[e-" -.f*t]'td 
+ {{iL*(t) f [f(k) - w*(t)]dN'(k, t)dt 
+ 3{q*[k^'(t), tle--t -(p*(t)}I (t)dt 
- [Vp(t)ew*6t] d + 3-*(t)w*(t)dt 
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Analyzing the last expression term by term, we find that (i) or (5.6) implies 
that the first term is a maximum when C'(t) = C*(t), (ii) implies the second 
is a maximum whenf[k'(t)] = w*(t), (iii) implies the third is a maximum 
when k'(t) = k*(t), (iv) implies the fourth is a maximum when V'(t) = 
V*(t), while the fifth is identical on every feasible path. But this is precisely 
what the theorem asserts. 
Theorem 5.2 
Define the optimal balanced growth path by f'(k*) = 8 + A, w* = f(k*)- 
f'(k*)k*, Y* = f(k*) and C* = V-Ak*. Assume that consumption on 
this path is greater than the subsistence level C* > C. If the initial ouput Y(O) 
and wage rate w(O) associated with a given initial employment distribution 
function N(k, 0) are sufficiently close to Y* and w*, then there exists a 
feasible path satisfying the conditions of Theorem 5.1 and exhibiting the 
following properties: for some 0 < t' < co: 
(i) C*(t) = C[Y*(t)], for 0 < t < t' when w(O) < w* [w(0) > w*] 
= Y*(t) -Ak*, fort' < t; 
(ii) w*(t) < w* [>w*], for 0 < t < t' when w(O) < w* [w(O) > w*] 
- w*,fort' < t; 
(iii) k*(t) < k*[>k*], for 0 < t < t' when w(O) < w*[w(O) > w*] 
= k*,fort' < t;and 
(iv) lim Y*(t) = Y*, lim C*(t) = C*. 
t+ Ho t+ Ho 
In terms of the now familiar phase diagram for the behavior of Y and 
w, the two typical cases are illustrated in Figure 9. 
w=o 
W(c=igtk=w) 
ye -an / (C?C,gk)=w) 
Y(o) - 





wko) w* wI w 
FIG. 9 
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Proof23 
Because it is the most interesting (as in a sense it represents underdevelop- 
ment), we concentrate on the case where w(O) < w*; the alternative case 
where w(O) > w* is essentially the same. The argument hinges on the 
assumption that [Y(O), w(O)] is close to (Y*, w*), since this assumption 
allows us to verify a provisional hypothesis that there is never obsolescence 
associated with the types of machine built after time 0. 
We observe first that if Y(O) ? Ak* + C and w(O) = w*, then the path 
described in the theorem exists for t' = 0. The planning authority simply 
invests enough in machines of type k* to maintain the wage rate w* and 
thereby provides consumption at least as great as the subsistence level, 
while the economy approaches the balanced growth path. Moreover, it is 
easily verified that this path satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1 with 
p*(t) = e-t. This result implies that whenever the economy reaches a point 
at which Y(t) ? Ak* + C and w(t) = w*, henceforth the planning au- 
thority should proceed precisely this same way. Thus, all we need show is 
that, starting close to (Y*, w*), the planning authority can optimally 
maneuver to a point Y(t') > Ak* + C and w(t') = w* at some time t' < oo. 
To see that this is indeed possible, suppose that each type of machine 
which is built after time 0 is utilized forever. Then, being chosen according 
to perfect foresight, k must satisfy the appropriate form of equation (4.12), 
which is 
k= wg(k ) (5.8) 
Also assume that C(t) = C. Under these hypotheses, if w(O) is close to w* 
and k(0) is chosen near or in {g'1[w(0)], k*}, then, at least initially, the 
behavior of Y and w is basically as it would be if k were chosen according 
to static expectations (such behavior depicted in Fig. 9 for C close to 0, 
or s = s, = sw variable but close to 1). Hence, provided Y(O) is sufficiently 
close to Y*, Y and w are both increasing. But, in conjunction with equation 
(5.8), this means that by ranging k(O) from ? k* to < g' 1[w(0)] we must 
find a unique g'-1[w(O)] < k*(O) < k* such that w(t) < w* and k(t) < * 
according as t < t' for some t' < oo. (This argument is represented dia- 
grammatically in Fig. 10.) Moreover, for Y(O) sufficiently close to Y* we 
have Y(t) ? Ak* + C, while for w(O) sufficiently close to w* we have 
w(t) < w* < f[k*(O)] < f[k(t)]; the former simply says that at time t' 
the planning authority should start along the balanced growth path, the 
23 In this proof we implicitly assume that the initial employment distribution func- 
tion satisfies a Lipschitz condition on an interval including [k(O), k*] or [k*, k(O)]. 
This enables us to utilize standard results concerning the existence and continuity with 
respect to initial conditions of solutions to a system of differential equations; modifica- 
tion of the argument to accommodate isolated discontinuities in the initial distribution 
is relatively straightforward. 





9g,-1(w(0)) V(0) * a. 
FIG. 1 0 
latter that, provided the planning authority does, the types of machine 
built after time 0 will never become obsolete. 
To complete the argument we must find a system of present values p*(t) 
for which, along the path just described, we have (1) the choice of technique 
(5.8) satisfying condition (iii) of Theorem 5.1, and (2) the capital stock 
(5.4) satisfying condition (iv) of Theorem 5.1. But direct calculation, the 
details of which are omitted here, verifies that 
p* =p* [A-f(kI W] with p*(t') = e-t' (5.9) 
will do nicely.24 (Intuitively, [5.9] simply recognizes that the social rate of 
return had better equal the net quasi-rent from the type of machine being 
built currently.) 
We strongly conjecture that, starting from an arbitrary initial employ- 
ment distribution function, optimal saving behavior will exhibit, at least 
eventually, the properties outlined here. However, answers to the really 
interesting questions raised in a wider context, for example, the nature of 
the dependence of obsolescence or specialization (that is, consuming at the 
subsistence level or investing at a zero level) on the particular form of the 
initial distribution, must await fuller analysis.25 
In any event, while the sufficient conditions for optimal saving behavior 
here are quite similar to those for the malleable capital model, the evolu- 
24 To satisfy condition (iii). However, if condition (iii) is satisfied and 
limp*(t) = 0, 
t-o c 
then condition (iv) is also satisfied. 
25 We should mention that obsolescence is clearly possible even with optimal saving 
behavior; the very "underdeveloped" economy may adopt relatively labor intensive 
techniques today only to discard them in favor of relatively capital intensive techniques 
tomorrow. It is fairly easy to construct an example of this phenomenon when A = 0. 
SAVING AND EXPECTATIONS HYPOTHESES 6i9 
tion of the economy near optimal balanced growth is quite different. On 
the one hand, the optimal saving rate is chosen to maximize the value of 
final output (condition [i]), while the present value of the capital stock 
goes to zero (condition [iv]), where both quantities are evaluated in terms 
appropriate to the objective of the planning authority (5.1). On the other 
hand, we notice that here the initial distribution of capital may entail both 
an earlier phase in which the economy's allocation of output is specialized 
and a later phase in which the economy's type of investment is specialized, 
where both phases have the effect of bringing the economy's production 
possibilities into accord with the planning authority's rate of time pref- 
erence. In the malleable capital model, these two phases coincide. 
VI. Probabilistic Expectations 
So far, we have considered two extremes in the formation of expectations: 
perfect foresight, where expectations are always realized, and static expec- 
tations, where expectations are never realized outside of steady states. 
What these two theories of expectations formation have in common is that 
the individual forms point estimates of wages and interest rates over the 
future and acts on those point estimates as if they were certain. It seems 
somewhat more reasonable to assume that individuals, when faced with 
uncertainty, recognize the existence of this uncertainty and act accordingly, 
that is, form some kind of probability distribution of outcomes and 
maximize the expectation of some functional of those outcomes. Indeed, 
this is the basic approach of modern portfolio theory and monetary theory. 
Should it not be equally applicable to the problems of the choice of tech- 
nique ? The following discussion should be considered only a first, tentative 
approach to these problems, but hopefully it will suggest lines along which 
future research may be directed. 
Consider an individual with a given wealth which he wishes to allocate 
over a portfolio of capital goods. Presumably, he wishes to do this in such 
a way as to maximize his expected (intertemporal) utility. In practice, it is 
more likely that he follows some simplified procedure, such as maximizing 
expected utility of the return on the portfolio or maximizing expected 
utility of wealth over some period. We shall follow the usual portfolio 
analysis of Tobin (1958), for example, and assume the portfolio of capital 
goods is chosen to maximize EU(R) where E is the expectation operator, 
R= [f(kt) +(k, t)] a(k)dk = { r(k, t)a(k)dk, (6.1) LIkq (k,t) q (k, t 
and a(k) is the proportion of one's portfolio invested in capital of type k, 
so that 
a(k) = 1. (6.2) 
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The necessary conditions for the optimal allocation can be written in 
parametric form: 
EU'r(k, t) < 7;(6.3) 
a(k)[EU'r(k, t) - 0. (6.4) 
The expected marginal utility of all capital goods held in the portfolio must 
be the same. 
The first question we ask is: how many of the capital goods held in the 
portfolio are simultaneously being produced, that is, have a price of 
unity? We shall assume that the individual acts as if prices are differentiable 
(that is, 4[k, t] exists), so for a capital good being produced, 4 = 0. Thus, 
we are asking: for how many capital goods can 
EU' -k - ? (6.5) 
As before, the expectation is taken only over those states of nature where 
w > . But if the range of possible wages is sufficiently small, the only 
capital intensities that need to be considered are those for which the 
machines will be used in all states of nature. In particular, if 
Wmein 
is the minimum expected wage, and 
Wmax 
is the maximum, then we shall assume that 
f[gl(we.)] > We (6.6) f m m max~ 
If, for instance, the ex ante production function is Cobb-Douglas with 
capital exponent of 4, then the range of uncertainty on the wage can be 
as large as 331 per cent. 
Under this assumption, we can take the derivative of the left-hand side 
of equation (6.5) with respect to k and obtain 
a4EU'f Wj 
L k w --'[ g'(k)] 67 
.= EU'{ k2 '(6.7) 
for k in the relevant range. 
There is a unique point at which the left-hand side of equation (6.5) is 
maximized, since then E{U'[w - g'(k)]} = 0, and this expression is un- 
ambiguously decreasing in k, that is, -EU'g"(k) < 0. Thus, any given 
individual will hold at most one type of new capital good in his portfolio. 
How does his choice of the type of capital constructed differ from his 
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choice if he had acted on the point estimate of the mean? We wish to 
compare g'(k) = (EU'w/EU') with g'(k) = Ew. 
So far, the analysis has been fairly general. To answer this question, 
however, we must know how the prices of the different kinds of capital 
goods are determined and how they change over time. We can simplify 
the analysis by assuming that there are no markets for used capital goods, 
so that an individual purchases the machines only for the quasi-rents he 
can obtain from them, not for short-term capital gains. Then r(k, t) = 
[f(k) - w(t)]/k, a decreasing function of w. Thus E(U' - U')(w -) 
> 0. But k > k if and only if g'(k) > g'(k) if and only if EU'w/EU' > Ew 
if and only if E(U' - U')(w - w) > 0, that is, the covariance between 
marginal utility and the wage is positive. Hence, we have shown that un- 
certainty raises the capital intensity of the machine constructed. 
A further difficulty is now introduced into the dynamic analysis. The loci 
of (vi = 0, Y1 = 0) may depend on the exact nature of the distribution of 
wages. In the following special case, we can establish local stability in much 
the same manner as in the previous cases. 
For convenience, we assume that the degree of uncertainty (for example, 
the variance of wage expectation) is a function of the amount of change 
in the economy, for example, vw/w, with zero variance if vw/w = 0, and that 
the mean wage is the wage today. Assuming again that a constant fraction 
of income is saved, along the curve s Y/g' - 1(w) = A, vw = 0, to the left of 
it vw > 0, to the right of it vi < 0. Although the exact slope or position of the 
Y = 0 curve cannot be determined (and indeed may shift over time), it 
lies everywhere above Y= Y*, and it is easy to show, consequently, that 
Y converges to Y*, w to w*, and k to k*. If, however, another specification 
of expectations formations were made, there is nothing to rule out the 
possibility of cyclical oscillations. 
VII. Vintage Models and Econometric Estimation 
Over the past decade, three of the focal points of econometric research have 
been the estimation of the residual26 (that part of the growth of output 
that cannot be explained by the growth in factor inputs), of the elasticity 
of substitution, and of the investment function. Most of this work has 
employed an aggregate production function with malleable capital. If in 
fact capital is not malleable, then a specification error has been made; it 
is the purpose of this section to explore the implications of this specification 
error.27 
26 See, for instance, Solow (1957), Denison (1962), and Griliches and Jorgenson 
(1967). 
27 In this section only, all real variables are measured extensively, that is, in natural 
units, rather than intensively, that is in labor units. 
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The Residual 
Solow (1957) in his classic paper assumed a production model which 
would have the form if there were no technological change, 
Y = F(K, L). (7.1) 
By differentiating the logarithm of (7.1), and assuming that factors were 
paid their marginal products, he obtained, 
K 
=(1 - c)n + a K where 1-x = share of labor. (7.2) 
The difference between the actual increase in output and the right-hand 
side of the above equation is the residual. 
For our vintage model, again under the assumption of no technological 
change, and also for simplicity, under the assumption of no depreciation 
= 2 we obtain 
f= (1 - a)n + I r, (7.3) 1'  
where r = [f(k) - w] k is the instantaneous rate of return (the quasi-rents 
on the type of machines being constructed at the moment). 
The first question that arises is, are these two models ever identical ? They 
are, if and only if for some valuation of the capital stock, K, we have (x = 
rKI Y. But this is equivalent to rI = H, where 
H = [f(k) - w]dN(k, t) = Y - w, (7.4) 
or K= V/r, which is the value of the capital stock if wages and the rate of 
return were to remain constant. This valuation of the capital stock is 
equal to the market valuation of the capital stock if and only if the 
economy has static expectations. Moreover, when w and r are changing, 
this definition has the obvious defect that K # I. 
The second question that arises is, what kind of residual would one 
obtain if one used the market value of the capital stock, V, where 
V(t) = f q(k, t)kdN(k, t)? (7.5) 
Since all capital goods must have the same rate of return, that is, 
q(k, t) = r(t)-f'k) - (t) for all k, (7.6) 
q(k, t) q(k, t)k 
28 We should mention that the inclusion of depreciation /i > 0 adds another 
source of bias in that the right-hand side of (7.3) then becomes (1 - a)n + af + 
I(r/ Y). Thus, for example, even when capital is measured so that I(r/ Y) = a(I/K) (see 
the discussion directly following), the residual includes a depreciation component (in 
fact a component just equal to acq). 
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we obtain 
4(k, t)kdN(k, t) = r(t) fq(k, t)kdN(k, t) - [f(k) - w(t)]dN(k, t) 
(7.7) 
or Capital Gains = r(t)V(t) - H(t). Hence we obtain 
y I Capital Gains I a~~n + a - + 
~~~~~(7.8) 
Thus, even if there were no technological changes, by using market valua- 
tion of the capital stock, one would obtain a residual of (Capital Gains/ Y) 
x (I/ V). Again, it should be noticed that I # V. 
A third approach to the problem is to consider each of the different types 
of capital goods as a separate factor. For example, assume that there are a 
finite number of different types of capital goods. Then denote by a k the 
share in national income of profits on machines of type k, that is, if employ- 
ment on machines of type k is denoted by dN(k, t), then 
=ek- f(k) wdN(k, t). (7.9) 
It immediately follows that 
f 
- ~~~~~I = I 
'2 ak )n + ak V~k) '(7.10) 
where V(k) is the value (and number, since q[k, t] = 1) of machines of 
type k, 
V(k) = kdN(k, t). (7.11) 
Observe that cek is always less than the share of profits, but V(k) is less than 
the total value of the capital stock. 
Elasticity of Substitution 
Since the Arrow, Chenery, Minhas, and Solow paper (1961), numerous 
attempts, using both cross-section and time-series data, have been made to 
estimate the elasticity of substitution. Almost universally, these have 
assumed a constant elasticity of substitution, malleable capital model of 
the form (here specialized to include only Harrod neutral technical 
progress). 
Y = {SK-P + (1 - 8)[LA(t)]-P}-(11, (7.12) 
so that 
Inw = (p + 1)[1n(Y/L) - InA(t)]. (7.13) 
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First, it is important to observe that if one did a cross-section or time- 
series estimate of the elasticity of substitution based on the assumption of 
malleability, the resulting estimate would have (except if the economies 
were in steady-state balanced growth) nothing to say about the elasticity 
of substitution of the ex ante production function if capital were not 
malleable. 
The following calculations suggest, moreover, why (at least in the con- 
text of time-series data) one might obtain an estimate of the elasticity less 
than unity for a developing economy. Taking the time derivative for the 
above equation, we obtain, 
= (0 + p)(-K-n) (l + P)A (7.14) 
whereas in our model we obtain 
w =(0 + Y) - y- n) 0 + y)S, (7.15) 
where 
(1 + wl = N (1-Y ) fi N) 
and 
= aN(k, t)/ak 
f'(k) 
For a developing economy, the output per man on new machines is greater 
than average output per man. Hence 8 > 0. But for economies near bal- 
anced growth, [aN(k, t)/ak]/N decreases approximately exponentially; so 
(1 + y) becomes arbitrarily large. In finite time (1 + y) > 1, so the "ap- 
parent" elasticity is less than unity, and for paths very near balanced 
growth, much less than unity. 
Investment Behavior 
In the models considered thus far, employment is exogenous and output 
endogenous. An alternative view is to consider output as determining em- 
ployment. (This is, of course, the Keynesian approach.) On the basis of this 
interpretation of the model, a theory of investment may be derived, which 
can be compared to the neoclassical theories of investment which assume 
malleable capital (see Jorgenson [1963]; Bischoff [1968]). Consider the 
simplified form of the theory as exposited by Jorgenson, where the malle- 
able capital production function is Cobb-Douglas with capital exponent a. 
(In order to make the comparison with our model as simple as possible, 
we will ignore all lags.) If r is the rate of return on capital, r = CV/CK = 
a Y/KD, where KD is the desired capital stock. In the absence of lags, 
desired and actual capital stock are equal; investment is just equal to the 
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difference between capital stock today and desired capital stock tomorrow, 
plus replacement, that is, 
f 
a 
y i Yr+ axY (7.16) 
r r r r 
where ,u is the rate of depreciation. 
This should be compared with the equivalent result for our model, 
where, if the unemployment rate u does not change, 
Y Y 
I=-+ [-(1 -u)(l -a)A + U]- (7.17) 
r r 
where, as usual, r = [f(k) - w]/k, the quasi-rents on machines constructed 
today, and a is the share of capital. The important point to observe is that 
investment is affected by the level of the rate of interest but not (directly) 
by changes in the rate of interest. Moreover, the coefficient of the first term 
in our model is unity, independent of the ex ante production function, 
whereas in the neoclassical model it is the share of capital. (Of course, if 
one uses an incorrect measure of r-in particular, too small a value of 
r-it will result, if one estimates the equation unrestricted, in a coefficient 
of Yir less than unity.) Finally, note that the coefficient, Y/r is to be inter- 
preted not as the rate of depreciation times the share of capital but as 
- (1 -a)A.29 
Thus, if coefficients really are fixed ex post, equation (7.16) may represent 
a serious specification error. The next question that arises is, what is the 
correct value of r to use in equation (7.17)? This depends on the nature of 
the expectations formation. Consider the two extremes: perfect foresight 
and static expectations. If individuals have perfect foresight, then r equals 
profits plus capital gains divided by the value of the capital stock.30 If 
individuals have static expectations, the correct measure of r is profits not 
including capital gains divided by the market value of the capital stock.31 
It should be emphasized that these results are only suggestive of the 
kinds of errors that appear in econometric estimation when it is assumed 
that capital is malleable and in part it is not. 
VIII. Summary 
In this paper we have analyzed, under a number of alternative saving and 
expectations hypotheses, the dynamics of an economy in which once a 
machine is constructed its production characteristics are fixed. Although in 
29 If there are variations in the unemployment rate, u, equation (7.17) becomes 
I = (Y/r) + [a - (1 - u)(1 - c)A](Y/r) + u[(1 - a)Y/r]. 
30 This is the measure correctly used by Bischoff (1968). Unfortunately, in other 
aspects, his model is not consistent with the perfect foresight assumption. 
31 Note that if and only if individuals have static expectations will the marginal 
capital-labor ratio k = f'-(r). 
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the long run these economies look very much like the simple neoclassical 
models analyzed, for instance, by Solow and Swan, in that under all the 
alternative assumptions the economy converges to balanced growth, this 
model admits of a much richer variety of behavior along the path to steady 
growth. For instance, in the model with static expectations where saving 
depends on income distribution, there are likely to be capital intensity- 
income distribution cycles (although they are always damped). Under the 
assumption that a constant proportion of income is saved, whether there 
is static expectations or perfect foresight, income per capita may "over- 
shoot" its long-run value-but only once; the wage rate, on the other hand, 
may increase or decrease several times, depending on the inherited capital 
stock. Moreover, in all cases, machines may be constructed which will 
eventually no longer be used because of economic obsolescence. 
As in other models of accumulation with heterogeneous capital goods 
and perfect foresight, although the price system is unstable in the sense that 
if the initial prices of different kinds of capital goods are incorrect, then the 
system does not converge to balanced growth, such paths eventually vio- 
late one of the perfect foresight conditions and are not true equilibrium 
paths. 
Optimal saving behavior, unlike that in the malleable capital model, 
results in roughly two phases of development: an earlier phase in which 
output is specialized in investment, and a later phase in which investment 
is specialized in a single technique. Both phases, as in the optimal evolution 
of the malleable capital model, result in providing production possibilities 
corresponding to the planner's rate of time preference. 
Finally, because outside of balanced growth the quantitative as well as 
qualitative behavior of the economy is different from that of the malle- 
able capital model, estimations of the residual, the elasticity of substitution, 
or investment functions based on the malleable capital model may be 
seriously misleading. 
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